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international criminal court
Kenya continueS to SeeK deferral 
in icc caSeS
Kenya has lost its latest bid to defer two 
cases against former government officials 
currently pending before the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). On May 30, 2011, 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II rejected the 
Kenyan Government’s challenges to the 
admissibility of the cases under Article 19 
of the Rome Statute. The concurrent judg-
ments from the Chamber stated that the 
Government’s challenge “did not provide 
concrete evidence of ongoing proceed-
ings before national judges,” as required 
by Article 17’s admissibility standards. 
The judgment is the latest setback for the 
Kenyan Government that has been strug-
gling for months in multiple settings to 
defer the ICC’s prosecution of six of its 
government officials accused of interna-
tional crimes that took place following the 
2008 presidential elections.
In February 2011, Kenyan President 
Emilio Mwai Kibaki met with 23 Kenyan 
envoys to develop strategies to convince 
the United Nations (UN) to defer the pend-
ing cases. Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
states that an investigation or prosecution 
may be deferred for a period of twelve 
months if a “resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that 
effect . . . .”
For the Security Council to adopt a 
Chapter VII resolution, however, it must 
determine that if an investigation or pros-
ecution were to proceed, such actions could 
result in a threat to international peace and 
security. Several countries have expressed 
their doubts as to the validity of such an 
argument. The United States Ambassador 
to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, stated 
publicly that the United States would 
likely veto Kenya’s request for a defer-
ral of the two cases presently before the 
Court if it were submitted for a vote to 
the UN Security Council. British High 
Commissioner to Kenya Rob Macaire 
shared a similar sentiment. During an 
informal interactive dialogue between 
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Kenya and the Security Council on March 
18, Kenya made its Article 16 argument, 
but members of the Council generally 
agreed that the situation in Kenya does not 
amount to a threat to international peace 
and security, and that the ICC would be 
the best venue for Kenya to challenge 
admissibility. Following Kenya’s official 
application to the UN for deferral, the 
UN Security Council failed to reach any 
agreement during an April 9 meeting — 
in essence defeating Kenya’s application. 
Without credible evidence that the investi-
gation would lead to unrest, it is difficult to 
imagine that the Security Council would be 
willing to interfere with the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion, as doing so would severely undermine 
the Court’s authority.
Kenya’s clearest path to a termination of 
the ICC case was thought to be by appealing 
directly to the ICC rather than the Security 
Council. Kenyan officials continue to argue 
that the ICC is a “court of last resort,” and 
that under the principle of complementar-
ity, there should be no investigation unless 
Kenya does not make a genuine effort to set 
up a local judicial process to investigate or 
try the accused. Article 53(4) of the Rome 
Statute provides that “[t]he Prosecutor may, 
at any time, reconsider a decision whether to 
initiate an investigation or prosecution based 
on new facts or information.” Kenya filed 
its application challenging the admissibility 
of the cases before the ICC on March 31 and 
asserted that it is capable of investigating the 
alleged crimes. While it was thought that the 
Kenyan Government’s best hopes lied with 
the discretion of the ICC, the recent deci-
sion rejecting the Government’s assertions 
makes a deferral increasingly unlikely.
Failing to show that Kenya is able and 
willing to conduct an investigation, a final 
option might be an amendment to Article 
16 of the Rome Statute, as proposed by the 
African Union (AU) in November 2009. 
The amendment proposes to allow the UN 
General Assembly authority to defer an 
investigation should the Security Council 
fail to act on such a request. This pro-
posed amendment, however, is unlikely 
to garner the support it needs to pass. 
Aside from altering the Rome Statute, 
this amendment would require that the 
Security Council cede more authority to 
the General Assembly — something it has 
not been historically willing to do since the 
formation of the UN. During the Sixteenth 
Ordinary Session of the AU, the Assembly 
called upon African States Parties to the 
Rome Statute of the ICC to join together 
“to ensure that the proposal for amend-
ment to Article 16 of the Rome Statute is 
properly addressed during the forthcoming 
negotiations and to report to the Assembly 
through the Commission.” Even if a united 
front of African States Parties supported 
this amendment, however, it is not clear 
that they could effect a change. A threat to 
depart from the Assembly of States Parties 
to the Rome Statute would not necessarily 
be effective, as the ICC would be reluctant 
to set a precedent by acquiescing to such 
demands. Additionally, withdrawal from 
the ICC’s jurisdiction does not take effect 
for one year from the moment of notifica-
tion and has no bearing on cases initiated 
prior to withdrawal. 
The Government of Kenya may, by June 
5, 2011, file an appeal against the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber decisions, in accordance 
with article 82(1)(a) of the Rome Statute 
and rule 154.1 of the Rules and Procedure 
and Evidence. At the time of this writ-
ing, no additional appeals to the Security 
Council or the ICC have been filed.
icc openS initial caSe in libyan 
Situation
On March 3, 2011, International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo (the Prosecutor) 
announced the opening of an investiga-
tion into possible crimes against human-
ity committed from February 15, 2011, 
onwards by Libyan “Security Forces.” The 
investigation comes as a result of Security 
Council Resolution 1970 (2011), which 
highlights the “grave concern at the situ-
ation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and 
condemn[s] the violence and use of force 
against civilians.” The resolution, which 
was adopted on February 26, referred the 
situation to the ICC. Security Council 
referral under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations is the only way that the ICC is 
given jurisdiction to proceed with an inves-
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tigation in situations that do not include 
States Parties to the Rome Statute.
On May 4, 2011, the Prosecutor issued 
an initial report to the UN Security Council 
indicating that the number of dead since 
February 15 is “in the thousands.” The 
report reveals that the “available informa-
tion provides reasonable grounds to believe 
that crimes against humanity have been 
committed and continue being committed 
in Libya.” 
Following the Security Council report, 
on May 16 the Prosecutor filed an applica-
tion for arrest with ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
I to issue arrest warrants against Muammar 
Abu Minya Gaddafi, Saif Al Islam Gaddafi 
and the Head of the Intelligence Abdullah 
Al Senussi for crimes against humanity 
committed in Libya since February 2011. 
Specifically, the application charges that 
Muammar Gaddafi “conceived and imple-
mented, through persons of his inner circle 
such as his son Saif Al Islam Gaddafi and 
Abdullah Al Senussi, a plan to suppress 
any challenge to his absolute authority 
through killings and other acts of persecu-
tion” executed by Libyan Security Forces. 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
provides that a “crime against humanity” 
means, among other acts, murder, extermi-
nation, rape, and torture “when committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack . . . .” As the 
first case brought in the Libyan situation, 
the application explicitly states that the 
initial charges are only for crimes against 
humanity committed against civilians and 
do not include war crimes committed dur-
ing the armed conflict that started at the 
end of February.
If allegations that security forces have 
attacked peaceful demonstrators en masse 
are accurate and unambiguous links to 
those in control are established, the case for 
crimes against humanity, as charged in the 
Prosecutor’s initial filings, appears clear. 
The situation becomes much murkier, how-
ever, if the Prosecutor decides to bring 
additional charges relating to war crimes 
under Article 8 of the Statute that may have 
been committed after the start of the armed 
conflict. The initial Security Council report 
indicates that there is information indicat-
ing attacks against civilians not taking a 
direct part in hostilities have taken place, as 
well as attacks directed “against buildings 
dedicated to religion, education, art, sci-
ence or charitable purposes,” which would 
meet Article 8 definitions of triable war 
crimes.
One of the first challenges, however, 
will be determining whether those killed 
in Libya are accurately described as civil-
ians. The Prosecutor has said that Libyan 
authorities decided that they were willing 
to kill unarmed protestors opposing Libyan 
leader Mummar Gaddafi’s rule even 
before the conflict began. International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) direc-
tor-general Yves Daccord has stressed that 
attacks directly targeting civilian popu-
lations are prohibited by international 
humanitarian law. However, Libyan gov-
ernment officials will likely argue that 
many of those referred to as civilians, in 
fact, do not qualify as non-combatants. 
Civilians who directly participate in hos-
tilities (DPH) lose their protected status 
under the Geneva Conventions, and can be 
legitimately targeted according to interna-
tional humanitarian law. However, DPH is 
not explicitly defined within international 
law and remains the subject of constant 
debate between states and international 
organizations. It is also possible that civil-
ians who have taken up arms in rebellion 
could be considered freedom fighters, or 
combatants seeking the independence of a 
country, a protected class under the Geneva 
Conventions.
A final defense for those accused of 
war crimes within the Libyan conflict may 
be to seek a defense through Article 31(c) 
of the Rome Statute. Article 31(c) provides 
that a person will not be criminally respon-
sible if, during their conduct: 
The person acts reasonably to  
defend himself or herself or 
another person or, in the case of 
war crimes, property which is 
essential for the survival of the 
person or another person or prop-
erty which is essential for accom-
plishing a military mission, against 
an imminent and unlawful use of 
force in a manner proportionate to 
the degree of danger to the person 
or the other person or property 
protected . . . .
The defense under Article 31(c) could 
be argued concurrent with assertions of 
DPH. If a significant number of civilians 
could instead be labeled as combatants, 
it would be far easier for Libyan heads of 
state to argue that their attacks were essen-
tial for accomplishing a military action, 
such as quelling an uprising.
The Prosecutor has stated that inves-
tigations are proceeding in the Libyan 
situation but, to date, has not brought any 
charges relating to war crimes. Pre-Trial 
Chamber I must now decide whether to 
accept the Prosecutor’s request, reject it, or 
ask the Office of the Prosecutor for more 
evidence.
Slava Kuperstein, a J.D. candidate at 
the Washington College of Law, covers the 
International Criminal Court for the Human 
Rights Brief.
international criminal tribunal 
for rwanda
trial chamber to allow eVidence 
outSide temporal juriSdiction of 
ictr
On February 3, 2011, in Ngirabatware, 
Trial Chamber II of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
denied the Defence Motion to Exclude 
Evidence Falling Outside the Temporal 
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The juris-
diction of the ICTR is limited to crimes 
committed in 1994. The defense sought to 
exclude testimony from three prosecution 
witnesses that shows the accused allegedly 
attended meetings in 1993 at which attacks 
against Tutsis were planned. Although 
consideration of evidence outside the tribu-
nal’s temporal jurisdiction is controversial, 
the Trial Chamber appropriately denied the 
motion because it ultimately has the discre-
tion to consider such evidence when it is 
relevant and has probative value. 
During negotiations establishing the 
ICTR, Rwanda proposed that the jurisdic-
tion of the tribunal encompass not only the 
April 1994 genocide, but also its related 
causes stemming from the beginning of the 
armed conflict in 1990. The UN Security 
Council rejected this proposition on the 
basis that applying Chapter VII powers 
to extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
to 1990 would be inappropriate because 
the armed conflict prior to 1994 was not 
a sufficient threat to international peace 
and security. However, pursuant to Rule 
89(C) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, the tribunal can “admit any 
relevant evidence which it deems to have 
probative value,” even if such evidence 
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concerns events falling outside the tempo-
ral jurisdiction of the ICTR. 
While the defense in Ngirabatware 
recognized the Trial Chamber’s power to 
consider evidence outside the temporal 
jurisdiction of the ICTR, it argued that 
the evidence at issue did not fulfill any of 
the purposes articulated by the Appeals 
Chamber in Nahimana for considering 
such evidence. In Nahimana, the Appeals 
Chamber held that a Trial Chamber could 
admit evidence concerning events outside 
1994 if, for example, it clarifies a given 
context, establishes by inference the ele-
ments of criminal conduct occurring in 
1994, or demonstrates a deliberate pattern 
of conduct. The prosecution argued that 
the witness testimony concerning the 1993 
events demonstrates a deliberate pattern 
of criminal conduct in planning attacks 
against Tutsis that continued into 1994, 
but the defense asserted that the evidence 
did not demonstrate such a pattern and 
should therefore be excluded. The Trial 
Chamber ultimately held that the purposes 
listed in Nahimana were illustrative but 
not exhaustive. However, the defense also 
argued that evidence capable of establish-
ing independent crimes should be excluded 
because it may lead to convictions per se, 
such as an automatic conviction based on 
the accused’s mere presence at meetings.
It has been suggested that admitting 
evidence outside the temporal jurisdic-
tion gives the tribunal a way to exer-
cise jurisdiction over crimes beyond those 
permitted by its statute. This possibil-
ity should be of concern to any tribunal 
with limited jurisdiction to ensure it does 
not overstep its legal authority, but the 
ICTR in Ngirabatware does not wrongly 
exercise jurisdiction merely by admitting 
evidence concerning events before 1994. 
Theoretically, the evidence concerning the 
accused’s alleged attendance at meetings 
where genocide was planned may create 
the danger of conviction per se for crimes 
such as conspiracy to commit genocide 
or complicity in genocide. However, this 
concern is not valid because although evi-
dence of criminal activity in 1993 may sup-
port conviction for crimes in 1994, under 
no circumstances can the ICTR actually 
convict the accused for any crimes com-
mitted in 1993. The Trial Chamber’s denial 
of the defense motion in Ngirabataware 
was therefore proper, because the tribunal 
has the authority to consider any relevant 
evidence with probative value, irrespective 
of whether the evidence may also relate to 
crimes outside the ICTR’s temporal juris-
diction. 
ictr requeStS Amici SubmiSSionS in 
referral caSeS
On November 4, 2010, the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP) at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
requested to transfer the Uwinkindi, 
Sikubwabo and Kayishema cases to 
Rwandan national courts pursuant to 
Rule 11 bis of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. On January 17, 2011, the 
ICTR decided to defer its decision on the 
Sikubwabo and Kayishema referrals until 
it reaches a final decision in Uwinkindi, 
or until Sikubwabo or Kayishema, who 
remain at large, are arrested. In seeking to 
resolve the referral issue, the ICTR granted 
permission to Human Rights Watch to 
appear as amicus curiae in Uwinkindi, 
and the International Criminal Defense 
Attorneys Association and Rwanda in 
Sikubwabo and Kayishema. Although the 
extent to which amicus submissions influ-
ence the ICTR’s decisions has been unclear 
in the past, the submissions concerning 
the possible referral of these three cases to 
Rwanda will likely influence the tribunal 
because of its need to make informed deci-
sions despite a limited capacity to inde-
pendently evaluate Rwanda’s judicial and 
penitentiary systems.
Traditionally, courts have regarded 
amici curiae as impartial advisers, but, 
in accordance with the prevailing modern 
view, the ICTR acknowledged in Bagasora 
that amicus briefs need not be impartial. 
The lack of impartiality has been crit-
icized because it may force parties to 
address issues not otherwise raised, pos-
sibly impairing fair trials without advanc-
ing the interests of the court. The extent 
to which amicus filings directly influence 
the ICTR is unclear, as the tribunal rarely 
references the submissions in its decisions 
and judgments, perhaps because doing so 
may indicate a lack of judge impartial-
ity. Nevertheless, in their article “The 
Role of Amicus Curiae before International 
Criminal Tribunals,” Sarah Williams and 
Hannah Woolaver suggest that amici influ-
ence prosecutorial discretion, which can 
ultimately affect the outcome of a case. 
For example, in Akayesu, the Coalition 
for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict 
submitted an amicus brief calling on the 
Chamber to order the OTP to include 
sexual violence charges in the indictment. 
Although the Trial Chamber did not issue 
a decision on the admissibility of the brief, 
the OTP subsequently sought to amend 
the indictment to include sexual violence 
charges, for which Akayesu was convicted. 
In the three cases proposed for referral, 
the amici submissions will not simply influ-
ence prosecutorial discretion, but they will 
likely influence the ICTR judges’ decisions. 
The ICTR requested the amici to address 
specific issues, such as the effectiveness 
of Rwanda’s witness protection system 
and the adequacy of detention facilities 
under international standards. Informed 
decisions regarding the transfer of cases to 
Rwanda require the tribunal to be familiar 
with Rwandan laws and the extent to which 
they are impartially enforced. Because 
limited resources already impair the ICTR’s 
progress on fulfilling core functions, it 
would be unreasonable for the tribunal to 
undertake its own complete evaluation of 
the status of Rwanda’s judicial and peni-
tentiary systems. Referring cases could 
accelerate the tribunal’s fulfillment of its 
completion strategy, but it should not be 
done at the expense of ensuring respect 
for the rights of the accused, victims, and 
witnesses. Therefore, amici participation 
in Uwinkindi, Sikubwabo and Kayishema 
is necessary and valuable to ensure that the 
ICTR appropriately determines whether to 
refer the cases to Rwanda. 
ictr admitS rwandan goVernment 
commentary on un mapping 
report
On March 31, 2011 in the Nzabonimana 
case, Trial Chamber III of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
granted the Defense Motion for the 
Admission of Documentary Evidence: 
“Official Government of Rwanda 
Comments on the UN Mapping Report 
on the DRC” (Mapping Report). In light 
of the purposes and methodology of the 
Mapping Report and the ICTR’s limited 
jurisdiction, the information included in 
the report and related commentaries may 
help contextualize the crimes alleged in the 
ICTR but will not significantly affect the 
tribunal’s proceedings. 
In September 2010, the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) released the Mapping Report 
to document basic information about the 
most serious human rights abuses and 
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violations of international humanitarian 
law that occurred in eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) between 
1993 and 2003. The Mapping Report 
assesses the Congolese judicial system’s 
ability to respond to the crimes, and identi-
fies potential transitional justice mecha-
nisms. The Report was not intended to 
accuse individuals of criminal liability, but 
to serve as a starting point for the DRC 
to understand and recover from a history 
of human rights abuses. To be included in 
the Mapping Report, a human rights viola-
tion must have been reasonably suspected 
to have occurred based on evidence from 
two independent sources – proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was not necessary. Based 
on the information gathered using these 
criteria, the report alleged that Rwanda was 
involved in perpetrating mass killings in the 
DRC, among other human rights abuses. 
The Rwandan government expressed its 
complete disapproval of the report in an 
official Commentary, stating that the meth-
odology was flawed and that the historical 
context had not been taken into account. 
The Defense in Nzabonimana sought to 
introduce portions of the Commentary 
that described the activities of militias in 
Rwanda as evidence. 
Pursuant to Rule 89(c) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, a chamber 
can admit any evidence that has proba-
tive value, meaning it tends to prove or 
disprove an issue. Additionally, the evi-
dence must be prima facie credible. The 
Prosecution alleged that the Commentary 
lacked probative value because it was 
highly susceptible to political bias. The 
Defense claimed that paragraph 8 of the 
Commentary undermines the Prosecution’s 
contention that various militias operated in 
Gitarama, Rwanda in 1994, as alleged in 
the indictment. The Prosecution asserted 
that the Commentary was not reliable 
because it lacked a signature, but the 
Chamber found the Commentary prima 
facie reliable because it is an official 
government document on file with the 
OHCHR. The Chamber further acknowl-
edged that admissibility of the evidence 
bears little relevance to the accuracy of 
its contents or the weight that it will ulti-
mately be accorded.
While the human rights abuses detailed 
in the Mapping Report and Rwanda’s 
responses in the Commentary may provide 
context for crimes being prosecuted at the 
ICTR, these documents will likely not be 
significantly relevant to ICTR proceedings 
particularly because the spatial and tempo-
ral jurisdiction of the ICTR precludes any 
prosecution for crimes committed outside 
of Rwanda during 1994. Nevertheless, 
these documents and the controversy sur-
rounding them underscore the far-reaching 
effects of war and the related challenges 
of achieving justice in societies that are 
undergoing and recovering from violent 
conflict. 
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for 
the Human Rights Brief.
judgment SummarieS: international 
criminal tribunal for rwanda
emmanuel ruKundo V. the 
proSecutor, ictr 2001-70-a
On October 20, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its 
judgment in the case against Emmanuel 
Rukundo, an ordained priest and military 
chaplain for the Rwandan army during 
the 1994 genocide. Rukundo was con-
victed of committing genocide for killing 
Madame Rudahunga and causing serious 
bodily harm to four Tutsis at Saint Joseph’s 
College, abducting and killing Tutsis from 
the Saint Léon Minor Seminary and for 
sexually assaulting a Tutsi woman. The 
Trial Chamber also convicted Rukundo 
of murder as a crime against humanity 
for Madame Rudahunga’s killing and for 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
for the abduction and killing of Tutsis from 
the seminary. The Trial Chamber sentenced 
Rukundo to twenty-five years in prison. 
The Appeals Chamber dismissed seven of 
Rukundo’s nine grounds for appeal and the 
Prosecution’s sentencing appeal, ultimately 
reducing Rukundo’s sentence from twenty-
five to twenty-three years, including time 
already served. 
Rukundo’s first successful ground for 
appeal was based on the Trial Chamber’s 
reliance on the expansive definition of “com-
mitting” in the Gacumbitsi, Seromba, and 
Ndindabahizi cases. The Trial Chamber 
held that Rukundo’s actions were an inte-
gral part of the crimes, even though he 
did not physically carry out any killing 
or any infliction of serious bodily harm 
to any of the victims. Rukundo argued 
that the Trial Chamber erred by convict-
ing him of “committing” genocide and 
crimes against humanity under Article 6(1) 
because he was not on notice that he was 
being charged with “committing” these 
crimes. The Prosecution argued that the 
issue was whether Rukundo had sufficient 
notice to prepare an effective defense, and 
maintained that Rukundo was aware he 
was being charged with “committing” the 
relevant crimes. The Appeals Chamber 
found that the indictment had only spe-
cifically charged Rukundo with order-
ing, instigating, and aiding and abetting 
the alleged crimes, and that therefore the 
Trial Chamber had erred by convicting 
Rukundo of “committing” genocide and 
crimes against humanity. As a result, the 
Appeals Chamber found him responsible 
for aiding abetting, and not “committing, 
genocide and murder and extermination as 
crimes against humanity. 
Rukundo’s other successful ground of 
appeal was his contention that the Trial 
Chamber erred in convicting him of com-
mitting genocide by causing serious mental 
harm to Witness CCH at the Saint Léon 
Minor Seminary through sexual assualt. 
Rukundo argued, inter alia, that the Trial 
Chamber erred in finding he intention-
ally inflicted serious harm with genocidal 
intent, because there was no evidence that 
he targeted Witness CCH based on her eth-
nicity. At trial, the evidence established that 
Witness CCH had approached Rukundo at 
the seminary and asked that he hide her. 
Rukundo responded that he could not help 
her and informed her that her “entire fam-
ily had to be killed” because her relative, 
who was a former friend of Rukundo, 
was assisting the “Inyenzi,” the deroga-
tory name used to reference the Tutsis. He 
then locked her in a room and sexually 
assaulted her. The Trial Chamber found 
that Rukundo’s statement that Witness 
CCH’s “entire family had to be killed” 
was proof of genocidal intent when con-
sidered in the general context of the mass 
violence being perpetrated against Tutsis. 
The Appeals Chamber, however, found 
that while evidence that an accused used 
expressions such as “Inyenzi” can, under 
certain circumstances, establish genocidal 
intent, “inferences drawn from circumstan-
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tial evidence must be the only reasonable 
inference available.”
The Appeals Chamber held that geno-
cidal intent was not the only reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the circum-
stances, as Rukundo’s use of the word 
“Inyenzi” could have been an expression 
of anger that his former friend was affili-
ated with Tutsis and not necessarily an 
expression of a personal desire to destroy 
all Tutsis. This inference was supported 
by the fact that Witness CCH had testi-
fied that Rukundo’s comment about her 
family being killed did not frighten her 
and that Rukundo later told Witness CCH 
that he would have hidden her if he had 
been able to. The majority of the Appeals 
Chamber also disagreed with the Trial 
Chamber’s reliance on the “general con-
text of mass violence” in relation to this 
incident. Specifically, the majority pointed 
to the fact that, in relation to the other 
incidents of genocide for which Rukundo 
was convicted, there was evidence of sys-
tematic, repeated searches for Tutsis on 
the basis of identity cards or lists, and the 
subsequent killing or assault of the indi-
viduals identified through such searches. 
By contrast, the sexual assault of Witness 
CCH “appears to have been unplanned and 
spontaneous.” Accordingly, the Appeals 
Chamber reversed Rukundo’s conviction 
for genocide by causing serious mental 
harm through sexual harassment.
The seven unsuccessful grounds of 
Rukundo’s appeal included allegations that 
the Trial Chamber committed errors of 
law, errors relating the alleged recantation 
of a Prosecution witness, errors of law 
and fact in evaluating the evidence, and 
errors in sentencing. Regarding Rukundo’s 
claim that the Trial Chamber erred in law 
and fact in convicting him of genocide 
and murder as a crime against humanity 
for the events at Saint Joseph’s College, 
the Appeals Chamber rejected Rukundo’s 
argument that the causal elements of mur-
der and serious bodily injury were not 
proven, noting that the Appeals Chamber 
had replaced Rukundo’s convictions for 
committing these crimes with convic-
tions for aiding and abetting. The Appeals 
Chamber stressed that for purposes of 
aiding and abetting, unlike committing, 
there is “no requirement of a cause-effect 
relationship between the conduct of the 
aider and abettor and the commission of 
the crime.” Rather, it is sufficient that the 
aider and abettor’s actions had a “substan-
tial effect” on the realization of the crime, 
that the aider and abettor had knowledge 
that his actions were assisting the principal 
perpetrator of the crime, and, in the case 
of specific intent crimes, that the aider and 
abettor knew that the principal perpetrator 
possessed the requisite intent.
Rukundo also argued that the Trial 
Chamber erred by excluding only por-
tions of a witness’s testimony rather than 
her entire testimony. The Trial Chamber 
had excluded a portion of the testimony 
given by Witness BLJ, one of the victims 
abducted at the college, regarding subse-
quent events that occurred at Kabgayi 
hospital, holding that the subject matter 
of the testimony was not supported in the 
indictment. The Trial Chamber had relied 
on other portions of Witness BLJ’s testi-
mony to support finding that Rukundo 
was linked to the earlier attack at the 
college. The Appeals Chamber held that 
it was within the Trial Chamber’s discre-
tion to find a particular piece of evidence 
inadmissible with regard to a fact of which 
the accused was not placed on notice, but 
admissible in relation to other allegations 
that had been sufficiently pleaded.
Rukundo also appealed his convictions 
for genocide and extermination as a crime 
against humanity at Saint Lèon Minor 
Seminary, arguing that the convictions 
were in error because the indictment did 
not specify the identity of the abducted 
victims or the dates of the abductions. The 
Appeals Chamber found that, given the 
large number of victims, their identifica-
tion as “Tutsi refugees taken from Saint 
Lèon Minor Seminary” was sufficiently 
precise, and the date range of April to May 
1994 was not unreasonably broad given 
that Rukundo had visited the seminary on 
four separate occasions during that period. 
Rukundo further contended that the Trial 
Chamber erred in its assessment of the 
evidence in convicting him for his par-
ticipation in the events at the seminary. The 
Appeals Chamber, granting deference to 
the discretion of the Trial Chamber, found 
that there was no error in the evaluation of 
the evidence that would occasion a miscar-
riage of justice.
Finally, finding that neither Rukundo 
nor the Prosecution had demonstrated that 
the Trial Chamber committed discernable 
error in assessing Rukundo’s sentence, 
the Appeals Chamber dismissed both 
Rukundo’s appeal against the sentence 
and the Prosecution’s request to increase 
Rukundo’s twenty-five year sentence to 
a life sentence. Recalling that it had dis-
missed the conviction for genocide by 
causing serious mental harm to Witness 
CCH, however, the Appeals Chamber 
reduced Rukundo’s sentence to twenty-
three years. 
Catlin Meade, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, wrote 
this judgment summary for the Human Rights 
Brief. 
the proSecutor V. ildephonSe 
hategeKimana, ictr-00-55b-t
On December 6, 2010, Trial Chamber II 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in the 
case of Prosecutor v. Hategekimana. The 
Chamber found Ildephonse Hategekimana 
guilty of genocide, murder as a crime 
against humanity, and rape as a crime 
against humanity. The Chamber based 
Hategekimana’s individual criminal 
responsibility on direct participation 
and actions as a superior, or Article 6(1) 
and Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute 
respectively. The Chamber sentenced him 
to life imprisonment.
During 1994 genocide, Hategekimana 
was Commander of the Ngoma Military 
Camp, a lieutenant in the Rwanda Defense 
Forces, the former national army, and a 
member of the Butare Préfectoral Council, 
which was responsible for peace and 
security in the Ngoma Commune. The 
Prosecution alleged that between April 
7 and May 13, 1994, Hategekimana par-
ticipated as a military official in a number 
of incidents that supported its charges of 
genocide and crimes against humanity, 
including the killing and raping of mem-
bers of the Tutsi population and Tutsi sym-
pathizers; the erection of roadblocks for the 
purpose of identifying, arresting, killing, 
or seriously harming individuals carrying 
Tutsi identification cards; the distribution 
of weapons; the issuance of laissez-passer 
(special emergency travel permits) to sol-
diers and others involved in the alleged 
criminal acts; and, the endorsement of a 
genocidal message through his attendance 
at an inflammatory speech.
Of the fourteen alleged incidents, the 
Chamber dismissed all but five. With 
respect to the dismissed allegations, the 
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Chamber found that the Prosecution had 
failed to present sufficient evidence to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Hategekimana bore criminal responsibility 
for the alleged acts.
Regarding the remaining five incidents, 
Defense counsel argued that Hategekimana 
could not be held responsible for any of the 
alleged acts, each of which involved the 
participation of soldiers from the Ngoma 
Camp, for two reasons. First, counsel argued 
that Hategekimana was not at Ngoma Camp 
at the time the alleged crimes were com-
mitted. Several witnesses testified as to 
Hategekimana’s hospitalization and recov-
ery in April 1994 from war injuries. Second, 
counsel argued that both Hategekimana 
and the Ngoma Camp soldiers he alleg-
edly led were injured, disabled, and sick, 
thereby rendering their participation in 
any of the alleged crimes impossible. The 
Chamber found Hategekimana’s alibi lack-
ing in credibility and held that he was 
present during five of the alleged incidents. 
The Chamber also found that the men at 
the Ngoma Camp included both injured 
and able-bodied soldiers and that the the 
injured men were not precluded from com-
mitting any of the alleged acts.
As to Hategekimana’s convictions, the 
Chamber found the accused guilty of both 
genocide and murder as a crime against 
humanity because of his participation in 
a joint criminal enterprise with Ngoma 
Camp soldiers, Interahamwe (a Hutu para-
military group), and armed civilians on 
three occasions. First, Hategekimana led 
armed soldiers from the Ngoma Camp to 
assist Interahamwe and armed civilians 
in identifying and murdering three Tutsi 
women on the night of April 23, 1994. 
Second, he led Ngoma Camp soldiers in 
a coordinated attack aimed at massacring 
500 Tutsis at the Ngoma Parish on April 
30, 1994. Third, Hategekimana ordered his 
soldiers to assist in an attack that led to the 
abduction and murder of more than twenty-
five Tutsis at the Benebikira Convent on 
April 30, 1994.
The Chamber determined that the 
accused’s participation in the joint criminal 
enterprise consisted of lending human 
resources and ordering the killing of civil-
ians, and it noted that “as the Ngoma 
Camp Commander and a respected local 
figure, Hategekimana’s presence and utter-
ances on the various crime scenes had a 
substantial effect on the killings which fol-
lowed.” Regarding the charges of genocide, 
the Chamber found in each instance that 
Hategekimana acted with genocidal intent. 
With respect to the charges of murder as 
a crime against humanity, the Chamber 
found that he had knowledge that the kill-
ings formed part of a broader widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds. In addition, 
the Chamber found that Hategekimana 
acted with the requisite mens rea to bear 
responsibility for murder as a crime against 
humanity based on the fact that he ordered 
Ngoma Camp soldiers to murder Jean 
Bosco Rugomboka on April 8-9, 1994. 
While the Chamber was also satisfied that 
the accused bore responsibility for the 
murder of Rugomboka under a theory of 
superior responsibility, it indicated that 
it would not sentence Hategekimana for 
the crime under both a direct and supe-
rior theory of responsibility, in accordance 
with prior ICTR jurisprudence. Finally, 
Hategekimana was found guilty as a supe-
rior for the rape of Nura Sezirahiga as a 
crime against humanity, based on a find-
ing that the accused had effective con-
trol over the perpetrator of the rape, who 
was a Ngoma Camp solider, and that 
Hategekimana failed to take the necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent the 
rape or punish the perpetrator thereafter.
The Chamber took into account a num-
ber of mitigating and aggravating cir-
cumstances in the decision to sentence 
Hategekimana to life imprisonment. The 
Chamber noted the well-established prin-
ciple in the jurisprudence of both the ICTR 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia that an individual’s 
personal position in the community should 
be considered in the determination of an 
appropriate sentence. Aggravating circum-
stances included Hategekimana’s local sta-
tus, role as a superior, level of education, 
and number of victims that resulted from 
the killings. The Chamber found few miti-
gating factors, although it did give weight 
to the fact that Hategekimana had a diffi-
cult childhood as an orphan and that he had 
an arduous experience in battle as a soldier 
for the Rwandan Army. Regardless of the 
mitigating factors, the Chamber found the 
gravity of the crimes and the aggravating 
circumstances appropriate grounds to sen-
tence Hategekimana to a single sentence of 
life imprisonment. 
Elizabeth Francis, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, wrote this judgment summary for the 
Human Rights Brief. 
the proSecutor V. gaSpard 
KanyaruKiga, ictr-2002-78-t
On November 1, 2010, Trial Chamber 
II of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) delivered its judgment 
in the case against Rwandan businessman 
Gaspard Kanyarukiga. The Prosecution 
brought three charges against Kanyarukiga 
for his involvement in the attacks on Tutsi 
civilians in the Kivumu commune at the 
Nyange Parish on April 15-16, 1994: 1) 
genocide, 2) complicity in genocide, and 3) 
extermination as a crime against humanity. 
The Chamber convicted Kanyarukiga of 
genocide and extermination and sentenced 
him to thirty years in prison. 
The Prosecution alleged, and the 
Chambers found, that following the death of 
Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana 
on April 6, 1994, Tutsi civilians were 
attacked in their homes in the Kivumu 
commune, and they subsequently sought 
refuge in public buildings, including the 
Nyange Parish Church. The Prosecution 
also alleged that Kanyarukiga attended 
meetings between April 10 and 16, 1994, 
at which attacks against the Tutsi civilians 
taking refuge in the Nyange Church were 
planned, and that Kanyarukiga ordered 
and instigated attacks on the civilians, 
including the bulldozing of the church, 
which resulted in the death of 2,000 Tutsi 
civilians. Specifically, the Chamber found 
that the Prosecution showed beyond a 
reasonable doubt that attacks against Tutsi 
civilians in the Kivumu commune occurred 
after April 6, 1994. 
The Prosecution also showed that armed 
attackers surrounded the Nyange Church 
on April 12, 1994, and that Kanyarukiga 
was present at meetings at the Nyange 
Parish on April 14, 1994. Kanyarukiga 
was present after, but not during, attacks 
perpetrated by Hutu assailants against the 
Tutsi civilians in the Nyange Church and 
an attempted burning of the church on 
April 15, 1994. There was also suffi-
cient evidence that Kanyarukiga attended 
a meeting on April 16, 1994, at which the 
destruction of the Nyange Church was dis-
cussed, and that he stated the church had to 
be destroyed and he would rebuild it. The 
Chamber found that on April 16, 1994, 
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the Nyange Church was destroyed using 
at least one bulldozer, killing approxi-
mately 2,000 Tutsi civilians, although there 
was not sufficient evidence to establish 
that Kanyarukiga was present during the 
destruction of the church. Ultimately, the 
Chamber found that the destruction of the 
Nyange Church and related attacks consti-
tuted genocide.
The Chamber did not accept 
Kanyarukiga’s alibi, by which the defense 
claimed that between April 12 and16, 1994, 
the accused was busy securing travel docu-
ments in an effort to ensure the safety of 
his family, and therefore not present at the 
Nyange Parish during the meetings and 
attacks against Tutsi civilians. The Defense 
filed the notice of alibi after the presentation 
of the Prosecution’s case, and did not final-
ize its list of witnesses until three months 
later. Many of the witnesses who testified 
in support of the alibi had an interest in the 
positive outcome of the case because they 
were related to, had business relations with, 
or depended financially on Kanyarukiga. 
Generally, the evidence presented by the 
witnesses lacked inconsistencies, which the 
Chamber typically expects when several 
different people testify, and the evidence 
was “too neatly tailored” to match the 
Prosecution’s specific allegations. Finally, 
the Chamber had misgivings about the route 
Kanyarukiga purportedly took to secure 
travel documents and locate his family. 
The time Kanyarukiga claimed it took him 
to travel was nearly double the time that 
the Chamber found it would be while on a 
site visit in 2010, and it was unlikely that 
Kanyarukiga would have taken the “pre-
carious, long and difficult” route with his 
family, particularly given the insecurity in 
Rwanda in April 1994. Because of these 
factors, the Chambers found that the alibi 
could not reasonably be true.
Regarding Kanyarukiga’s responsibil-
ity for genocide, the Prosecution alleged 
that the accused bore responsibility, either 
individually or as a member of a joint 
criminal enterprise, pursuant to Article 
6(1) of the ICTR Statute, which states that 
“a person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abet-
ted in the execution of [a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal] shall be 
individually responsible for the crime.” 
The Chamber determined that the plan-
ning mode of liability most accurately 
captured Kanyarukiga’s alleged conduct. 
To be convicted of planning, the accused, 
either alone or with others, must design 
criminal conduct that is later perpetrated, 
the planning must substantially contribute 
to the commission of genocidal acts, and 
the accused must have the intent to plan the 
commission of a crime or know that there 
is a substantial likelihood that crime would 
be committed.
Kanyarukiga’s participation in meet-
ings at which attacks against the Tutsi 
civilians were planned, and particularly 
his statement that the Nyange Church had 
to be destroyed and that he would rebuild 
it, demonstrated that he helped plan the 
criminal conduct that was later carried 
out when the church was bulldozed. The 
Chamber found that the plan to destroy 
the church substantially contributed to the 
commission of genocide because the bull-
dozing of the church resulted in the death 
of 2,000 Tutsi civilians. Genocidal intent 
can be inferred from the facts, so long as 
it is the only reasonable inference avail-
able. The Chamber found that because 
Kanyarukiga knew that Tutsi civilians tak-
ing refuge inside the church would be killed 
if the church were destroyed, he acted with 
the intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group 
in whole or in part. The Chamber therefore 
found Kanyarukiga guilty of genocide. 
Although the Prosecution also charged 
the accused with complicity in genocide, 
the Chamber did not consider this count 
because an accused cannot be convicted of 
both genocide and complicity in genocide. 
Turning to the charge of extermination 
as a crime against humanity, the Chamber 
reiterated that, under Article 3 of the ICTR 
Statute, crimes against humanity must 
be committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian pop-
ulation on national, political, ethnic, racial 
or religious grounds. Extermination is the 
act of killing on a large scale, although there 
is no numerical minimum that constitutes a 
“large scale.” The Chamber found that the 
destruction of the Nyange Church was 
part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against Tutsi civilians, that Kanyarukiga 
knew his actions in planning the destruc-
tion of the church formed part of this 
broader attack, that the killing of 2,000 
Tutsis could “only be described as large 
scale,” and that the accused intentionally 
contributed to the killing of Tutsi civilians 
on a large scale. Therefore, Kanyarukiga 
was also guilty of extermination as a crime 
against humanity.
To determine Kanyarukiga’s sentence, 
the Chamber considered the gravity of the 
offense, aggravating circumstances, miti-
gating circumstances, and past sentencing 
practices of the Tribunal. The Chamber 
did not find that Kanyarukiga deserved the 
most severe sentence because, although 
his conduct was grave, the Prosecution 
did not establish that the accused directly 
participated in, or was present during, 
the destruction of the Nyange Church 
and the resulting deaths of Tutsi civil-
ians. However, the Chamber considered 
the particular vulnerability of the victims, 
who took refuge in a place of worship and 
were prevented from escaping, an aggra-
vating circumstance. The Chamber treated 
Kanyarukiga’s age, which appeared to be 
between 63 and 72 years, as a mitigat-
ing circumstance. The Chamber took into 
account comparable sentencing practices 
in similar cases. Individuals convicted of 
genocide and extermination as a crime 
against humanity have been sentenced for 
twenty-five years to life imprisonment, 
except where the accused pled guilty or 
there were substantial mitigating factors. 
Taking all of these factors into account, the 
Chamber sentenced Kanyarukiga to thirty 
years in prison for genocide and extermi-
nation as a crime against humanity.
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, wrote this judgment summary for the 
Human Rights Brief.
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international criminal tribunal 
for the former yugoSlaVia
former hoStageS of the republiKa 
SrpSKa army teStify againSt 
KaradžiĆ
On February 2, 2011, former UN mili-
tary observer Patrick Rechner testified at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) about his expe-
rience as one of over 200 UN staff mem-
bers taken hostage by Republika Srpska 
Army (VRS) forces in May and June of 
1995. The prosecution alleges that the VRS 
used the hostages as human shields at stra-
tegic military locations to prevent NATO 
air strikes on those targets in violation 
of jus in bello. Former Republika Srpska 
President Radovan Karadžić is charged 
with ordering the hostage taking and, in 
the alternative, with failing to act once 
made aware of it. While Karadžić argues 
UN staff were captured and treated legiti-
mately as prisoners of war, testimony from 
numerous prosecution witnesses suggests 
otherwise.
The taking of hostages in non-interna-
tional conflicts is a grave breach of the laws 
and customs of war codified in Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. There 
are three elements of the crime of hostage-
taking. A perpetrator must: (1) seize one 
or more hostages, (2) control the hostages 
and (3) intend to use the hostages to force 
concessions from another party. Karadžić 
is not the first defendant before the ICTY 
to be charged with hostage-taking. In 2004, 
the ICTY convicted Tihomir Blaškić of 
taking civilian hostages with the intent 
of forcing his opponent to cease mili-
tary operations and of killing hostages. 
The prosecution alleges that Karadžić and 
former General Ratko Mladić centrally 
controlled hostage-taking activities of the 
VRS.
On the morning of May 26, 1995, VRS 
forces captured Patrick Rechner and two 
other members of his military observer 
team in Pale, Bosnia. Rechner testified 
that at the time of his capture, he called 
Jovan Zametica, Karadzic’s senior political 
advisor, who advised Rechner to cooperate 
with his captors. The VRS transported the 
hostages to an ammunition depot where the 
VRS handcuffed the hostages to a light-
ning rod and the depot warehouse’s door. 
The VRS repeatedly warned the hostages 
that if NATO carried out air strikes, they 
would either die in the attacks or be exe-
cuted in retaliation. During the six hours 
that Rechner was chained to a lightning 
rod, he was visited by Zametica. In addi-
tion to Zametica’s visit, the widespread 
hostage-taking and transport of hostages 
supports an inference that a central control-
ling authority organized the hostage-taking 
activities. 
Karadžić argues that the UN peace-
keepers and observers were members of a 
“warring side,” and therefore their capture 
and detention was legitimate under the 
laws of war. During his cross-examination 
of Rechner, Karadžić attempted to estab-
lish that VRS forces told Rechner that 
he was being held as a prisoner of war 
and given rights and privileges afforded 
to prisoners of war. VRS forces granted 
many requests of the hostages, including 
requests for a visit from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, phone calls 
home, visits from a doctor, and television 
access. Rechner explained that the televi-
sion access was for purposes of receiving 
information from the media. Karadžić con-
cluded his cross-examination by express-
ing empathy for Rechner’s ordeal, but also 
maintained that his sympathies lay with 
those affected by NATO airstrikes.
Regardless of whether Karadžić estab-
lishes that the UN staff held hostage by the 
VRS were combatants under international 
humanitarian law, it is likely that the ICTY 
will find that the elements of the crime 
of hostage-taking under Common Article 
3 are satisfied. Testimony and evidence 
adduced by the prosecution support the 
conclusions that the VRS seized over 200 
hostages, that hostages were under VRS 
control, and that the VRS intended to use 
the hostages to prevent UN air strikes on 
VRS military installations. If the prosecu-
tion establishes that Karadžić and Mladić 
centrally controlled hostage-taking activi-
ties, it is unlikely that Karadžić will be able 
to successfully defend this charge.
ĐorĐeViĆ Sentenced under joint 
criminal enterpriSe for KoSoVo 
atrocitieS
On February 23, 2011, Trial Chamber 
II of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sen-
tenced former Serbian Assistant Minister 
of Internal Affairs (MUP) and Public 
Security Department (RJB) Chief Vlastimir 
Đorđević to 27 years of imprisonment for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Đorđević’s was the fifth and final case at 
the ICTY addressing atrocities in Kosovo. 
The Trial Chamber found Đorđević indi-
vidually criminally responsibility under 
Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute for the 
crimes of forcible transfer of a popula-
tion, murder, and persecution, as crimes 
against humanity. The Chamber also found 
Đorđević guilty of murder as a violation of 
the laws and customs of war. The Chamber 
convicted Đorđević under the doctrines of 
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) and aid-
ing and abetting under Article 7(1). The 
doctrine of JCE provides a mechanism for 
establishing complete individual criminal 
responsibility for acts that require coordi-
nated action by multiple individuals. The 
Chamber also stated that it alternatively 
could have found him guilty under Article 
7(3) of the statute for failure to prevent 
and punish these crimes. Trial Chamber 
II’s holding Đorđević responsible for these 
crimes under a theory of JCE builds on 
ICTY jurisprudence and illustrates how 
the ICTY applies JCE.
JCE is not defined in the ICTY’s stat-
ute. While the ICTY cites post-World 
War II cases as the source of the doc-
trine of JCE, it largely developed in the 
ICTY’s jurisprudence. Under Article 7(1) 
of the ICTY Statute (Individual Criminal 
Responsibility), “[a] person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the planning, prepara-
tion or execution of a crime referred to in 
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall 
be individually responsible for the crime.” 
The ICTY ruled in the Tadić case that 
Article 7(1) is supported by customary 
international law and allows Chambers to 
determine an accused’s guilt “as a princi-
pal or an accessory or otherwise as a par-
ticipant.” Specifying where JCE falls under 
Article 7(1), the Appeals Chamber held 
in the Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s 
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction that JCE 
is a form of criminal liability for “com-
mission” of a crime. This substantially 
expanded the meaning of “commission” 
under Article 7(1) from the standard writ-
ten into the ICTY Statute. 
Applying a theory of JCE as a form of 
“commission” requires satisfying distinct 
elements. Establishing actus rea under a 
theory of JCE involves three elements: 
the existence of a group working towards 
achieving a common purpose, the common 
purpose of this group being the commis-
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sion of a crime under the ICTY’s stat-
ute, and participation by the accused in 
furthering this group’s goal of achieving 
this common purpose. Under the variant 
of JCE applied in this case (JCE 1), the 
prosecution establishes the adequate mens 
rea for commission of a given crime under 
JCE when it demonstrates that the accused 
intended to aid in perpetrating that crime 
along with his co-perpetrators. 
In Đorđević, the prosecution presented 
evidence that, between March and June of 
1999, Đorđević collaborated with other 
top Serbian leaders in Kosovo to violently 
drive out the ethnic Albanian population. 
The prosecution asserted that Đorđević 
had effective control over police forces in 
Kosovo responsible for committing mass 
atrocities including systematic shelling of 
towns and villages, burning of villages 
and farms, sexual assaults, and the ensu-
ing deportation of approximately 800,000 
Kosovar Albanians. The defense argued 
that these crimes were not attributable to a 
joint criminal enterprise and that, even if a 
joint criminal enterprise existed, Đorđević 
could not have significantly contributed to 
a common plan because he lacked effective 
control over MUP forces in Kosovo. The 
defense asserted that the crimes commit-
ted were “isolated incidents perpetrated by 
random individuals” and that coordinated 
actions by Yugoslav army and MUP only 
targeted “terrorist forces.” 
Rejecting the defense’s arguments, the 
Trial Chamber held that, “The nature of 
the crimes that have been established and 
the circumstances in which they were com-
mitted clearly demonstrates that the target 
of this campaign was the Kosovo Albanian 
population.” The Trial Chamber held that 
Đorđević was a key participant in the 
joint criminal enterprise because he exer-
cised effective control over the police in 
Kosovo and helped to conceal the murders 
of Kosovo Albanians. Noting Đorđević’s 
complete failure to investigate crimes com-
mitted by MUP forces and his aiding in 
concealing the bodies of murdered Kosovo 
Albanians, the Trial Chamber also found 
Đorđević responsible for aiding and abet-
ting the same crimes he was convicted of 
under the theory of JCE. Furthermore, 
the Trial Chamber stated that it would 
have found Đorđević guilty under a theory 
of command responsibility, ICTY Article 
7(3), if its finding of guilt under Article 
7(1) had not precluded the Trial Chamber 
from doing so.
The prosecution logically followed 
expansive ICTY jurisprudence in estab-
lishing Đorđević’s guilt under a theory of 
JCE. The tribunal established JCE to allow 
prosecution under Article 7(1) (individual 
criminal responsibility) in complex cases 
where the prosecution would encounter 
difficulty proving a more restrictive defini-
tion of “commission.” Given evidence of 
the involvement of other Serbian leaders 
and Đorđević’s involvement in the actions 
of Serbian police and paramilitary forces, a 
conviction under JCE was the prosecution’s 
best possible strategy. A conviction under 
aiding and abetting or for failure to prevent 
and protect would have been unlikely to 
result in such a substantial sentence. Thus, 
Đorđević’s case illustrates the significance 
of the development of JCE at the ICTY.
Ivan Carpio, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia for the Human Rights 
Brief.
9
Kuperstein et al.: Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Cou
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
